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(first nature) and its transformation or reification through the “process of socialization” (sec-
ond nature), shows that Hegel was not so much a body-disavowing idealist like Kant, but was
rather critical of mind-body dualism. The authors emphasize the distinction because it enables
them to think through a dialectical relation between man and nature that leaves open the pos-
sibility of using critique to “renaturalize” what actually is “first nature” (“humans remain nat-
ural organisms”), and “denaturalize” the “distorted mirror” that is “second nature.” The dis-
tinction also aligns with the eco-Marxist “metabolic rift” theory, according to which the dia-
lectical relation between man (society) and nature – characterized as a metabolism (Stoffwech-
sel) – is distorted.
Despite the “continuous” and dynamic conception of the relation between nature and society,
and the statement that “concepts and theories of nature are not innocent,” the manifesto still
seems to hold on to a relatively traditional (objectified) notion of nature. By deploying such
formulations as “societies’ natural environments,” and “our experiences of nature” (own em-
phasis), a critical reader is permitted to wonder if the manifesto’s working conception of nature
might in fact be regarded as too innocent. Precisely because notions of “nature” have been
essential for legitimizing oppression and domination, it is not clear how the distinction be-
tween “first” and “second nature” can be so easily drawn in the first place. From within modern
European societies, “second nature” refers to all the existing rules, norms, customs, and beliefs
that “enslaved” humans within this sociality, the “dereification” of which critical theory saw
as one of its main tasks. However, what in modernity belonged to “first nature” were also
humans and non-humans considered to belong to “primordial” or “wild nature” (the literally
enslaved). The question of who or what belongs to “first nature,” and who or what to “second
nature” is thus itself part of “second nature” (engrained, socialized norms and institutions).
Moreover, the manifesto mentions the Marxist/Hegelian idea that “for a society to reproduce
itself, it must satisfy the needs of its members via a transformation of external nature.” The
problem, though, is that it does not account sufficiently for the fact that it was the subjection
of colonized and enslaved people which enabled the reproduction of capitalist societies
through their metonymic equivalence with “external nature.” In the same way that colonization
was viewed as the primary stage of “primitive accumulation” in Marx – rather than part of the
social struggle between capitalists and the proletariat – the colonized seem to be left out of the
Eurocentric picture by not being part of society, or “second nature.” How can we account for