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How Critical is “Second Nature”? A Diagnosis and an Antidote
Louis Carré
Even for a naturalist, names matter. One should welcome the new label “critical naturalism”
and wish it good luck on the contemporary philosophical battlefield, where various opponents
– be they reductive or liberal sorts of naturalism – are already waiting for the fight. Yet, as the
Manifesto repeatedly states, the initial proposal of combining “critique” and “nature” under
one and the same heading is an invitation to raise further questions, among which: How critical
actually can the concept of nature work? And how far should we be critical in our discursive
uses of it? One thrilling path opened by the Manifesto pertains to the concept of “second na-
ture.” Conceived as a way to escape both reductive naturalism and supernaturalism, “second
nature” allows us to adopt “nature-skeptical” and “nature-endorsing” arguments (Soper 1995)
as it comes to grasp the historically changing and complex interrelationships of other-than-
human natures and all-too-human societies. Two claims are indeed central for a “second na-
ture” approach in critical social philosophy. On the one hand, it affirms that the realm of the
social is to be conceived as taking the secondary shapes of embodied habits, customs, rules,
and institutions, in which first nature – be it internal or external – exists insofar as it is socially
mediated. To put it with Adorno, “in truth second nature is primary” (Adorno 1984). On the
other hand, “second nature” firmly opposes constructivist and hybridist approaches where first
nature seems to vanish beneath its secondarization. Far from disappearing altogether, first na-
ture here is seen as persisting through its mediated forms in the second nature of the social.
Since Hegel, we know that mediation is neither about construction nor artificialization, but
about dialectically relating analytically distinct terms (in our case, “nature” and “society”).
However promising the path might look, the question about the critical potential of “second
nature” yet remains overt. The strong and convincing philosophical commitments behind “sec-
ond nature” are not per se critical. Again with Adorno, one could say that “second nature” is
only “tainted with critique” (Adorno 2015). If not critical all the way round, it even appears
here and there – in Adorno, for instance – as a direct target of social critique.
One example of how “second nature” becomes an object of critique rather than operating as a
critical tool is provided by Hegel in his anthropology (Hegel 1978). Putting into question the
mind-body dualism, the anthropology is also the place where Hegel develops some of his most