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The Critical Naturalism Manifesto: Some Comments
Hans Radder
By and large, I sympathize with this Manifesto and its main ambition to rehabilitate nature in
the context of critical theory. The authors cover many topics, which are necessarily treated
quite concisely. For the most part, these topics could be convincingly developed by revisiting
them in more detail.
1
Some of them, however, require minor or major revision. In this com-
mentary, I briefly address three related issues.
1. I agree with the authors that critical theory should involve more than a reconstruction of the
norms of social critique (Thesis 7, 108-109; all page numbers refer to the Manifesto). Yet, this
normative dimension cannot be left out. On this issue, the position of the Manifesto is unclear.
It states, for instance, that “critique must not be thought of as a judgment” (118). But in fact
the Manifesto abounds with judgments, for instance where it interprets and criticizes phenom-
ena as “inequalities and relations of domination”. More generally, the authors state that “Crit-
ical Naturalism proceeds negatively, by a critique of what is given, the prevailing forms of
life” (119). What is lacking is a normative account that tells us why a defence of the prevailing
forms of life is mistaken or wrong.
2
Such an account also needs to address the issue of the
epistemic normativity of critical theories themselves. As the authors rightly say, “theorists and
theories have a tendency to overshoot” (120). Since only empiricists (wrongly) think that we
can, or even should, do without theories, advocates of critical theories need to reflect on what
theories can, and cannot, accomplish. For this purpose they can profit from insights in recent
philosophy of science, according to which the scope and justifiability of general theories also
depends on their connections to particular models and specific empirical procedures.
2. The Manifesto is explicitly presented as a philosophical work. As such, its general style is
quite traditional. Its theses and arguments are mostly abstract and theoretical. Even the more
specific topics in the third section, meant to be “exemplary sketches of the varying ways to
practice naturalist social critique” (108), are described in quite general terms. In contrast, for
several decades many branches of philosophy (for instance, the philosophies of science, tech-
nology, ethics, and politics) have developed approaches that are “empirically informed”. That
is, their theoretical arguments are confronted with detailed studies of a variety of concrete
practices. It is true that several of the references to the Manifesto include investigations of