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of study that systems theory came to inuence, including urban planning, economics,
political science, and psychology, among others. He notes its importance for thinkers
such as Friedrich Hayek and, most notably, Niklas Luhmann. Ultimately, he writes,
the lesson of systems theory “is that we cannot and should not seek to control things.
Control is an attribute of the System” (189).
Chapter four considers the central ction of systems theory: self–regulation.
Neocleous considers Enlightenment liberalism and bourgeois political economy
through the lens of “systems” thinking and the idea of self-regulation. These modes of
thought, he argues, “encourage us to imagine society as constituted through a system
of natural liberty operating as a vast, orderly, and living system in which economic
behaviour and vital need go hand in hand” (226). Chaos, from this perspective, entails
the dissolution of ordered structure. This leads to a uniquely accessible discussion of the
political and philosophical implications of entropy and thermodynamics. “The laws of
thermodynamics and the concept of entropy point to the disorder in any system and
the fact that all systems […] come to an end” (236). Thus, entropy has been a point of
fear for many political thinkers, who have sought the political equivalent of Maxwell’s
Demon, an entity capable of violating the law of entropy and thus “able to govern the
system” (248).
The idea of a political and philosophical fear of entropy and chaos leads us
naturally into a discussion of nerves, nervousness, and the nervous system as it relates to
immunity and its politics. Once again, systems theory serves as the centre of Neocleous’
critique, specically its anti-Freudian attempt to reduce the idea of nerves to a singular
meaning. For systems theory, nerves are simply means of processing and communicating
information; the idea of nervousness in the common sense is completely absent. Systems
theory ignores the emotional, subjective, and psychological connotations of nerves such
that it makes no sense to say that a system feels nervous.
Neocleous provides a strong counterargument to systems theory here, addressing
the social and political implications of nervousness, nervous breakdowns, and burnout.
He provides an invaluable political reading of the memoirs of Daniel Paul Schreber,
restoring the work’s original intention as a critique of medical incarceration. The
chapter wraps up with a discussion of the idea of a state having a nervous breakdown.
Moving beyond the journalistic trope – which only ever casts the Western state on the
verge of breakdown, but never quite there yet – Neocleous argues that in the excessively
nervous state the “security system responds […] by searching for enemies, by nding
enemies and by fabricating new enemies” (300). Through this process, he argues, the
state, whether Fascist or liberal democratic, can turn self–defence into self–destruction,
falling victim to a societal autoimmune disorder.
Finally, the sixth chapter considers immunity as a legal ction propping up
sovereign power, with a particular eye towards the notion of non-combatant immunity
in warfare. Here Neocleous engages in a fascinating reconstruction of the genealogy
of immunity’s political meaning, moving from its origins in Roman law as a term of
privilege, through its seldom discussed medieval developments as implying defence and
protection, and on to the emergence of the idea of non-combatant immunity in the
eighteenth century. Taking up literature in international law and norms surrounding war,